Is It Happening Here?

A history of 1930s fascism invites some uncomfortable parallels with today.

Benito Mussolini expounds on American carnage.

I picked up Robert Paxton’s 2004 book The Anatomy of Fascism hoping to gain some insights about our current political situation in the United States. To my surprise, I put it down believing that Donald Trump and his followers fit the fascist template quite well, following its playbook much more closely than I realized.  

There are some major differences, thankfully, between our country today and Italy in the 1920s. But again and again, I was struck by the similarities. “Mussolini’s movement . . . boiled with readiness for violent action, anti-intellectualism, rejection of compromise, and contempt for established society,” Paxton writes.  What current American group does that sound like?

Fascism was not so much a program or ideology as it was a “mood.” It was built on angry resentment, “a sense of overwhelming crisis” and “the belief that one’s group is a victim” that is justified in using violence “without legal or moral limits against its enemies both internal and external.”

As for Trump’s very loose relationship with facts, there is a clear precedent for that. Paxton, a retired Columbia University historian, observes that, “The truth was whatever permitted the new fascist man (and woman) to dominate others.”

Also, Trump seems to gravitate naturally to the inflated rhetoric of fascism. His insistence in his 2017 inauguration speech on the existence of “American carnage” is classic fascist language, as was his assertion in his acceptance speech at the Republican convention a few months earlier that “I alone can fix it.” Paxton notes that fascism thrives on creating an air of chaos and then claiming that the current crisis is so grave and unprecedented that only its radical solutions can remedy it.

Ultimately, Paxton observes, “the fascist mission” was national aggrandizement and purification.” MAGA, anyone?

How does fascism move from the fringe to gaining a toehold on power? As Mr. Rogers said in a very different context, Look for the helpers. The key for both Mussolini in the ‘20s and Hitler in the ‘30s was conservatives who held power but feared they would lose it to the left unless they made alliances with the fascists, giving them a place inside a governing coalition. In the United States, it has been conservative enablers such as Mitch McConnell, Ted Cruz, Lindsey Graham, and others. They are the necessary accomplices. “That was,” Paxton finds, “the final essential pre-condition of successful fascism: decision-makers ready to share power with fascist challengers.”

Interestingly, Paxton adds that the historical record indicates that conservatives will crush fascism when they see they have the power to do so. He notes that this happened in Romania, Portugal, Spain and Brazil. “If conservatives could rule alone, they did,” he writes.

Once he was in the White House, Trump often seemed to flail. That would be no surprise to readers of Paxton, who writes of “the chaotic lines of authority that characterized fascist rule.” On top of that, fascist leaders often were “suspicious of competent associates.”

The similarities between Trump and the rise of European fascism also underscored for me some major differences.

The hard left in the Europe of the ‘20s and ‘30s—that is, big Socialism and Bolshevik-inspired Communism—was far more powerful than the American left is today. It scared conservatives into the arms of fascists. America’s left doesn’t scare anyone, I think, except some professional right-wing agitators. Also, despite worrisome inequality, America’s economy is in far better shape that were those of the 1930s.

Also, Trumpism has not established the “parallel” structures—a party, a system of clubs, a street militia—that are typical of fascism.

European fascism also offered “fresh faces,” most of them young and energetic, Paxton notes. Thus far, Trumpism generally has not. Its new faces so far have tended to be more loose cannons than anything else: Marjorie Taylor Greene, Lauren Boebert, Matt Gaetz, and their ilk. Even so, those congressional Republicans seem to me typical of how “fascist regimes allowed opportunists to flood into the parties.”

Most importantly, our courts have held the line. After the anti-government riot of January 6, 2021, the strongest check against Trumpist violence was not the ballot box or the legislative branch, but the judiciary. When fascists tried to gain power in Europe, Paxton records, “judicial and administrative due process was fascism’s worst enemy.” In Germany, “One critical decision was whether the police and the courts would compel the fascists to obey the law.” They did not. Luckily for the United States, our police and courts have done better.  

For all that, Paxton poses a problem that I still find myself pondering. “Fascism,” he says, ”is a phenomenon of failed democracies.” He explains that “Fascist interlopers cannot easily break into a system that is functioning tolerably well.” So I wonder: Do these parallels to European history indicate that American democracy failing? My interim answer is that it isn’t, but that a significant portion of Americans, about twenty percent, believe it has. That is, they have given up on American democracy as it is constituted nowadays. Some of them are simply white supremacists who dislike seeing minorities gain political power and positions of prestige. But others may be sensing, accurately, that the American middle class is getting screwed by oligarchs who are running American politics while maintaining the appearance of democracy, and these people are turning to Trumpism out of despair.

This book told me more about what is going on in America in 2024 than the headlines are doing. It provided a framework that I will use often as I watch events unfold. If Trump wins re-election, I think we will have to endure that Paxton calls “a mature fascist-conservative alliance.”